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Abstract
We study a demand and supply model of judicial discretion in corporate bankruptcy. On the supply side,
we assume that bankruptcy courts may be biased for debtors or creditors, and subject to career concerns.
On the demand side, we assume that debtors (and creditors) can engage in forum shopping at some cost.
Ak e yﬁnding is that stronger creditor protection in reorganization improves judicial incentives to resolve
ﬁnancial distress eﬃciently, preventing a "race to the bottom" towards ineﬃcient uses of judicial discretion.
The comparative statics of our model shed light on a wealth of evidence on U.S. bankruptcy and yield novel
predictions on how bankruptcy codes should aﬀect ﬁrm-level outcomes.
JEL classiﬁcation: G33, K22.
Keywords: Judicial Discretion, Corporate Bankruptcy.
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and the University of Zurich. We have received helpful comments from Ken Ayotte, Antonio Cabrales, Vedran
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Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, Andrei Shleifer, Alex Stomper, Per Strömberg, Amir Suﬁ, Oren Sussman, Angel Veciana.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Judicial discretion is a central feature of state-mandated bankruptcy procedures. Either directly
or through the appointment of administrators, bankruptcy judges routinely shape the approval of
reorganization plans and the extent of distressed ﬁnancing, which in turn can crucially shape the
resolution of ﬁnancial distress.1 But how does judicial discretion work? The leading view holds that
under discretion judicial idiosyncrasies shape the resolution of ﬁnancial distress (e.g. Weiss and
Wruck 1998). It is indeed the case that bankruptcy outcomes vary enormously across bankruptcy
judges, sometimes favoring debtors, some other times favoring creditors (Bris et al. 2006, Chang and
Schoar 2006). However, this view cannot explain, among other things, why judicial idiosyncrasies
do not average out just like pure noise. For example, as Franks and Torous (1993) put it, U.S.
Chapter 11 is systematically pro-debtor because it has “strong incentives to keep the ﬁrm as a
going concern even when it is worth more in liquidation”.2
We present a simple Econ101 demand and supply model of judicial discretion that parsimo-
niously rationalizes why resolutions of ﬁnancial distress diﬀer across courts but do not average out
within a given code, and yields an array of novel predictions on the workings of court-supervised
bankruptcy procedures and their impact on ﬁrm level outcomes. One key ﬁnding is that the work-
ings of judicial discretion are crucially shaped by creditor protection in reorganization: only when
creditor protection is strong enough does judicial discretion generate a "race to the top" towards
eﬃcient resolutions of ﬁnancial distress.
Prior seminal work on judicial discretion in bankruptcy (Giammarino and Nosal 1994; Bernhardt
and Nosal 2004) focused on whether random judicial mistakes are desirable. We instead explicitly
model judicial decision-making under discretion by recognizing that the forces of demand and
supply shape the way bankruptcy judges use their discretion, as they do with market producers in
traditional economic analysis. Our model hinges on two main assumptions. On the supply side, in
line with Gennaioli (2005) and Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) we assume that bankruptcy judges can
1For example, U.S. Chapter 11 leaves bankruptcy courts discretion on issues such as ﬁrst day orders, reﬁnancing,
extensions of exclusivity, appointments of trustees, and the ﬁnal approval of a reorganization plan. As Gilson (1991)
puts it, Chapter 11 "eﬀectively requires judges to set corporate operating policies". Recent estimates suggest that
the price of judicial discretion in ﬁnancial markets can be very large. Ayotte and Gaon (2006) ﬁnd that credit
spreads increased by about 30 basis points for Chapter 11-eligible securitizers immediately after a controversial
judicial decision in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of LTV Steel, in which a securitization contract was unexpectedly
treated by the judge as a secured loan, and as such subject to automatic stay.
2Political economy theories (e.g. Skeel 2001, Bolton and Rosenthal 2002) explain the systematic pro-debtor bias of
bankruptcy laws with the political preferences of legislators, but cannot explain why resolutions of ﬁnancial distress
vary across bankruptcy courts because they assume judicial discretion away.
1be biased in favor of debtors or creditors. On the demand side, we assume that in ﬁnancial distress
debtors and/or creditors can choose where to ﬁle for bankruptcy ("forum shopping"), subject to
some legal restrictions. This is consistent with U.S. evidence, whereby about 60% of the large
Chapter 11 cases between 1980 and 2005 has been classiﬁed as forum shopping (e.g. Lo Pucki
2005, Ayotte and Skeel 2004).
In this setup, we investigate the role of creditor protection, parameterized as the share of
reorganization proceeds that can be pledged to creditors. While we think primarily of creditor
protection as the extent of violations of absolute priority (Franks and Torous 1989), this parameter
can also capture private beneﬁts of control (Aghion and Bolton 1992) or even debtors’ tunneling
of corporate assets during reorganization, especially in developing countries (Djankov et al. 2006).
Section 2 illustrates our static model. Section 3 presents a dynamic version where judges also
care about attracting future, large bankruptcy cases. In both Sections we illustrate our basic results
by assuming that only debtors can forum shop, consistent with the evidence that about 95% of
large U.S. Chapter 11s ﬁlings are initiated by debtors (Lo Pucki 2005). In the static model, debtors
naturally forum shop to pro-debtor judges that over-reorganize bankrupt ﬁrms. Thus, the demand
side of our model can create a systematic pro-debtor bias of the bankruptcy code, even if individual
judges are on average unbiased. Interestingly, under career concerns there is a pooling equilibrium
where even unbiased and pro-creditor judges over-reorganize to establish a pro-debtor reputation
and try to attract future ﬁlings. Thus, under career concerns the supply side of our model can
amplify the systematic pro-debtor bias of the bankruptcy code.
Our main ﬁnding is that stronger creditor protection reduces the systematic pro-debtor bias of
bankruptcy outcomes by shaping both the supply and the demand of judicial discretion. Three
eﬀects are simultaneously at work in the same direction. First, by reducing the rents earned by
debtors in reorganization, higher creditor protection reduces debtors’ incentive to forum shop. This
demand eﬀect directly reduces the systematic pro-debtor bias by dampening the sorting of cases
in pro-debtor courts. Second, under career concerns an increase in creditor protection induces a
dynamic supply eﬀect: anticipating future lower demand, unbiased and pro-creditor judges have
fewer incentives to establish a pro-debtor reputation, which also reduces pro-debtor bias today.
Finally, higher creditor protection reduces debtors’ rents in reorganization, in turn reducing the
incentive of pro-debtor judges to over-reorganize a bankrupt ﬁrm (the static supply eﬀect).
This analysis yields two implications. First, our model predicts that higher creditor protection in
reorganization should reduce the systematic pro-debtor bias of bankruptcy outcomes. By improving
2judicial incentives, higher creditor protection avoids a “race to the bottom” towards any ineﬃcient
use of judicial discretion. Interestingly, Section 4 shows that a similar prediction follows from
an increase in legal restrictions to forum shopping. Our model thus provides two novel potential
determinants of the variation of systematic bias across bankruptcy codes.
Second, our career concerns model shows that existing attempts to empirically identify the
consequences of forum shopping (Lo Pucki 2005, Ayotte and Skel 2004), which hinge on comparing
bankruptcy outcomes in diﬀerent courts, say Chicago and Delaware, are likely to underestimate
the consequences of forum shopping and the extent of pro-debtor bias because they overlook that
forum shopping induces an endogenous increase in the pro-debtor stance of all courts.
Section 5 augments our basic framework by studying additional demand and supply shifters.
First, we allow some courts to be faster than others. In this setup, not only does forum shopping
beneﬁcially allow the sorting of cases into fast courts, but also, undesirably, a pooling, pro-debtor
equilibrium is more likely to arise. The intuition is that the dynamic supply eﬀect is ampliﬁed as fast,
pro-debtor courts face an even greater future demand, at least as long as speed and unbiasedness are
uncorrelated. Despite this undesirable eﬀect, one insight of this analysis is that forum shopping
to fast courts can be beneﬁcial under fairly general conditions. In this context, strong creditor
protection and low legal restrictions to forum shopping create incentives for beneﬁcial competition
among courts, thereby generating a race to the top towards more eﬃcient resolutions of ﬁnancial
distress. Second, we study the case in which even creditors can forum shop with some probability,
and we show that under some conditions a systematic pro-creditor bias will follow. Third, we
study the case in which judges observe a noisy signal of the ﬁrm’s reorganization value and show
that the costs of judicial bias and thus of forum shopping are greater for ﬁrms in more innovative
industries, facing more uncertain future prospects.
In sum, our demand and supply model of judicial discretion provides a ﬂexible framework
to study the determinants of the workings of court-supervised bankruptcy procedures, providing
predictions on the volume and composition of forum shopping, the size and direction of systematic
bias, and on the variation of bankruptcy outcomes across ﬁrms. Section 6 illustrates how our model
can rationalize a wealth of cross-section and time series evidence on U.S. Chapter 11.
32 The Static Model
We now present a basic demand and supply analysis of judicial discretion. An existing ﬁrm is in
ﬁnancial distress. The ﬁrm has current cash ﬂow of zero, has defaulted on its debt, and has entered
a formal bankruptcy procedure under court supervision.3 To resolve ﬁnancial distress, it must be
decided whether the ﬁrm is reorganized or liquidated piecemeal. Here we focus on ex post outcomes
in bankruptcy; Appendix 2 studies the ex ante consequences of court behavior, along with some
contractual reactions to judicial discretion.
The value of the ﬁrm under piecemeal liquidation is λ>0. The reorganization value of the
ﬁrm equals ρ, a random variable taking values ρ and ρ with probability 1/2,w h e r eρ>λ>ρ .
As a result, liquidation is ex post eﬃcient if and only if the reorganization value is ρ. Investors
are pledged the full liquidation value λ but only a fraction α of the reorganization proceeds. The
remaining share (1 − α) of the reorganization proceeds goes to the debtor. Thus, the debtor prefers
reorganization to liquidation even if the latter is socially eﬃcient because under liquidation he
obtains zero while under reorganization he obtains (1 − α)ρ. Parameter α p l a y sak e yr o l ei no u r
analysis and can be thought of as measuring creditor protection in reorganization: if α is higher,
creditors can obtain a larger share of the reorganization proceeds. Parameter α can be given several
real-world interpretations. For instance, it can measure the extent to which creditors are protected
against the violations of their contractual priorities in favor of the debtors, an important source of
rents for debtors particularly in the bankruptcies of large, publicly listed U.S. corporations (e.g.
Franks and Torous 1989, Weiss 1990).4 Alternatively, α can measure creditor protection against
tunneling (or other forms of private beneﬁts extraction) by debtors, which is especially relevant in
developing countries (Djankov et al. 2006).5
3We focus on the resolution of ﬁnancial distress occurring in a state-provided, court-supervised bankruptcy pro-
cedure. As a result, we disallow the parties to do away with judicial discretion by contract, consistent with the
cross-country empirical evidence of Djankov et al. (2006) that there are many legal restrictions to doing so. Even
if contracts were allowed, however, Gennaioli and Rossi (2007) show that the optimal contract sometimes uses judi-
cial discretion and that the misuse of judicial discretion is costly for the parties. Our paper can thus be viewed as
specifying the nature of the costs of judicial discretion in bankruptcy.
4Interestingly, even if violations of priority was a choice variable in our model, so that bankruptcy courts were
allowed to discretionally violate absolute priority up to a share (1 − α) of a debtor’s obligations, then we would be
essentially back to the current model because pro-debtor judges would always grant the maximal violations and then
distort the reorganization decision to beneﬁtd e b t o r s . T h eo n l yd i ﬀerence with the current model would be that
pro-creditor judges would never violate absolute priority and would thus attain the ﬁrst best.
5These interpretations of α imply diﬀerent mappings of the model with reality. The "violation of priorities"
interpretation does not hinge on debtors being in control, as the debtors may obtain reorganization rents through
equity stakes [Gilson (1990) shows that U.S. CEOs retain substantial equity stakes in bankrupt ﬁrms (average 10%)].
The "tunneling-private beneﬁts" interpretation requires instead that the debtor controls the bankrupt ﬁrm for at
least some period. [Gilson (1990) and Hotchkiss (1995) show that U.S. CEOs’ and board members’ retained their
4But how is it decided whether the ﬁrm is reorganized or liquidated? Our basic premise is that
the bankruptcy procedure gives bankruptcy judges some discretion on this dimension.6 In the next
subsection, we present a model to study the consequences of judicial discretion for the resolution
of ﬁnancial distress.
2.1 The Supply Side: Bankruptcy Courts’ Decision-Making
We study judicial decision-making under discretion by taking the shortcut that bankruptcy courts
decide whether to reorganize or liquidate the ﬁrm. Throughout our paper, we hold constant such
judicial power to aﬀect bankruptcy outcomes and study which factors aﬀect judges’ willingness
to use it in one way or another. For now we assume that courts perfectly observe the ﬁrm’s
reorganization value ρ but might still be unwilling to do the right thing. Section 4.3 studies the
more general case where courts observe a potentially noisy signal of ρ.
After observing ρ,c o u r tj maximizes a weighted sum of the debtor and creditor’s utilities. The
non-negative parameters βj,c and βj,d indicate the weights the court attaches to the creditor’s and
the debtor’s welfare, respectively.7 As a result, the court’s pro-debtor8 bias βj = βj,d/βj,c fully
identiﬁes bankruptcy court j.A t a n y ρ,c o u r tβj chooses the probability xβj (ρ) with which the









α + βj (1 − α)
¤
xβj (ρ) (1)
Consistent with intuition, expression (1) indicates that if the ﬁrm is liquidated (i.e. xβj (ρ)=0 ),
seat after emerging from bankruptcy in about 50% of cases in the 1980s and early 1990s, Ayotte and Morrison (2007)
show that such percentage has recently decreased to about 20%]. Thus, deﬁned π as the extent to which creditors’
claims are violated, ψ as the probability that a bankrupt debtor is immediately replaced, e as his equity stake, t and
b as the amount of tunneling and private beneﬁts, respectively, one can combine the two interpretations by deﬁning
α ≡ 1−πe−(1−ψ)(t+b). Section 5 uses this decomposition of α to rationalize, in light of our model, the evolution
of U.S. bankruptcy outcomes.
6Several sources of judicial power can ultimately aﬀect the way ﬁnancial distress is resolved. Consider extensions
of exclusivity. If the judge extends the exclusivity period where only debtors are allowed to ﬁle a reorganization
plan, it is harder for the creditors to move the case forward without the debtor’s consent, reducing the likelihood of
liquidation. Similar reasoning applies to the appointment of a trustee and to the granting of ﬁrst day orders. To be
sure, judges might aﬀect the above decisions not only by exercising their legal right to do so but also by exploiting
discretion in ﬁnding facts (Gennaioli 2005; Gennaioli and Shleifer 2006), especially if the social value of alternative
d e c i s i o n si su n v e r i ﬁable and debtors and creditors disagree.
7Deﬁning judicial bias with respect to the parties’ welfare implies that in our model judicial bias translates directly
into deviations from ﬁrst-best eﬃciency. We do so because our main goal is to understand the positive consequences
of judicial discretion, not to assess the desirability of judicial mistakes as in Berkovitch, Israel and Zender (1998),
Bernhardt and Nosal (2004) and Giammarino and Nosal (2004).
8Strictly speaking, βj is the judge’s relative bias in favor of the debtor controlling an eventual ﬁling decision. In
closely-held ﬁrms one can interpret the bias as being pro-CEO, in widely-held ﬁrms one can interpret the bias as
being either pro-CEO, pro-board of directors or pro-controlling shareholders.
5then the creditor obtains λ while the debtor obtains zero. If instead the ﬁrm is reorganized (i.e.
xβj (ρ)=1 ) then the creditor obtains αρ and the debtor obtains (1 − α)ρ. The court evaluates
the desirability of such liquidation policies in both state ρ and ρ by comparing the parties’ utilities
under liquidation and reorganization in each state.
By solving (1) one ﬁnds that in state ρ court j reorganizes the ﬁrm (i.e. xβj(ρ)=1 )i fa n d
only if βj ≥ βρ ≡
λ−ρα
(1−α)ρ,w h i l ei ns t a t eρ court j reorganizes the ﬁrm (i.e. xβj(ρ)=1 )i fa n do n l y
if βj ≥ βρ ≡
λ−ρα
(1−α)ρ. Intuitively, a judge with higher βj is more likely to reorganize irrespective
of ρ so as to allow the debtor to extract reorganization rents. At the same time, liquidation is
more likely at ρ,i . e .βρ ≥ βρ because judges are less willing to rule for the debtor if reorganization
imposes a large loss on the creditor. Figure 1 below illustrates the adjudication policies for diﬀerent
judges as a function of their bias βj.
Figure 1 - Discretion and Bias
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), judges have the incentive to take the
eﬃcient decision, that is to liquidate in state ρ and to reorganize in state ρ. By contrast, highly
biased judges will always cater towards their preferred party, irrespective of the ﬁrm’s reorganization
value: pro-debtor judges with βj ≥ βρ always reorganize, pro-creditor judges with βj ≤ βρ always
liquidate.




,w h e r e
I (.) is the indicator function. The ﬁrm is liquidated with probability 1 − xβ (ρ). The probability
of reorganization increases in the ﬁrm’s reorganization value ρ. It is immediate to ﬁnd that:
Proposition 1 Ah i g h e rβ increases the probability of reorganization and reduces repayment. Ex
post eﬃciency falls in |β − 1|.
Intuitively, more pro-debtor courts (i.e. with larger β) are more likely to reorganize all ﬁrms,
including those with poor prospects. In addition, β reduces expected repayment to creditors be-
6cause the most pro-creditor courts fully focus on maximizing creditor repayment. Concerning ex
post welfare, if the bankruptcy court is unbiased, it eﬃciently reorganizes the ﬁrm in state ρ and
liquidates it in state ρ. If instead the court is biased (β 6=1 ), then ex post eﬃciency falls as
pro-debtor judges reorganize too often, while pro-creditor judges liquidate too often.9
A straightforward consequence of judicial discretion is thus to allow judicial biases to aﬀect the
resolution of ﬁnancial distress. As we shall discuss in Section 6, the supply side of our model is
consistent with a wealth of evidence on the variation of several bankruptcy outcomes across U.S.
courts (e.g. Chang and Schoar 2006, Bris, Welch, and Zhu 2006). A drawback of the current model
is that it cannot explain the kind of systematic biases in the resolution of ﬁnancial distress prevailing
under diﬀerent bankruptcy codes and documented by bankruptcy scholars (Skeel 2001, Franks and
Torous 1989, 1993). Typically, some courts will be unbiased, some will be pro-debtor and some
pro-creditor. Thus, if cases are randomly allocated across courts, judicial discretion would mainly
cause idiosyncratic variation of bankruptcy outcomes and not a systematic bias.
We formalize this argument by fully characterizing the supply side of our model. Assume that




,w h e r eβ ≤ βρ <β ρ ≤ β,w i t h
c.d.f. B(β) and E (β)=1 . In words, some courts always reorganize, others always liquidate, the
rest takes the eﬃcient decision, but courts are on average unbiased. We now show that adding a
demand side to our model can generate a systematic bias in the resolution of ﬁnancial distress over
and beyond the idiosyncrasies of individual judges.
2.2 The Demand Side: Debtors’ Forum Shopping
The demand side of our model relies on the assumption that ﬁrms can self-select into their preferred
bankruptcy courts ("forum shopping").10 In this Section, we provide a sharp illustration of the
workings of our model by assuming that debtors directly choose the bankruptcy venue ex post,
but Section 5.2 shows that our demand and supply analysis easily extends to the case where also
9For now we focus on the outcomes of court preceedings, but Appendix 3 shows that judicial bias is still costly
even if we allow the parties to enter into private workouts. Intuitively, even if the workout succeeds, judicial bias
constitutes an out-of-equilibrium threat allowing debtors to renegotiate on favorable terms with creditors, reducing
repayment.
10Although most bankrupcy codes contain provisions aimed at restricting "forum shopping", substantial ﬂexibility
still exists, especially for large companies. For example, the U.S. bankruptcy venue statute recognizes four connections
between a debtor and his bankruptcy court. The court must either be: (1) at the “domicile or residence” of the
debtor, (2) at the debtor’s “principal place of business”, (3) at the location of the debtor’s principal assets, or (4)
where the bankruptcy case of an aﬃliate is already pending. In practice, companies have been able to get around
the ﬁling restrictions in diﬀerent ways. For example, LoPucki and Whitford (1991) ﬁnd that in the 1980s large
pre-bankrupt ﬁrms from all over the U.S. began transferring their headquarters in small oﬃces in Manhattan to be
able to ﬁle at the New York court.
7creditors can forum shop.11 The assumption that debtors forum shop is realistic: 94% of all large
U.S. Chapter 11 cases from 1980 to 2005 (678 out of 722) were initiated by debtors, and 57%
(411 out of 722) have been classiﬁed as “forum shopping” (Lo Pucki 2005).12 Forum shopping is
also increasingly pervasive in Europe (Enriques and Gelter 2006), and around the world, especially
among multinational ﬁrms (Rasmussen 2007, Guzman 2000).
We assume that debtor i can freely choose where to ﬁle by bearing a forum shopping cost ci
that is uniformly distributed in [0,c]. Empirically, a higher c captures a bankruptcy code placing
stricter legal restrictions to forum shopping. We study the allocation of cases to bankruptcy courts
by leaving aside the issues potentially arising from court congestion, but our main results continue
to hold if courts can attract at least some cases from other courts.





such court, the expected payoﬀ of a debtor with reorganization value ρ is equal to (1 − α)ρxβ0 (ρ),
namely the debtor’s reorganization rents times the probability that reorganization takes place. If the
debtor engages in forum shopping, then he ﬁles in a more pro-debtor court β with xβ (ρ) >x β0 (ρ),
as there is no incentive for him to ﬁle in a court that is equally or less favorable than the natural
one. In particular, debtors would naturally want to forum shop in courts that surely reorganize,
i.e. courts with β ≥ βρ. Once forum shopping is considered, judicial discretion naturally implies
that debtors seek relief from creditors by strategically ﬁling in a favorable bankruptcy courts.
At any given ρ, debtor i forum shops if ci ≤ (1 − α)ρ
£
1 − xβ0 (ρ)
¤
and sticks to court β0 other-
wise. The debtor engages in forum shopping whenever the cost is less than the beneﬁto fd o i n gs o .






1 − xβ0 (ρ)
¤o
.
Intuitively, debtors endowed with a relatively less favorable natural bankruptcy venue (i.e. with
lower β0) are more eager to forum shop to very pro-debtor courts.
This consideration has immediate implications for the systematic bias of bankruptcy outcomes.
11Debtors’ ﬁling power may come from two sources. First, the U.S. bankruptcy code stipulates that both debtors
and creditors can ﬁle for bankruptcy, although creditors have to meet stronger standards, e.g. §301, 303. Second,
debtors are likely to enjoy a ﬁrst mover advantage in ﬁling for bankruptcy because they are informed before and more
accurately than their creditors about their ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial problems. [Jensen and Meckling (1976) stress that such
ﬁrst mover advantage may jeopardize creditors’ claims by allowing debtors to engage in asset substitution.] Crucially,
even if creditors challenge the venue choice, it is the debtor-chosen court to have the ﬁn a ls a y ,o f t e nr e s u l t i n gi nt h e
pro-debtor court retaining the case.
12See LoPucki’s data at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm. Forum shopping is widespread in various other
areas of the law, too. For example, White (2006) ﬁnds that when asbestos lawsuits are ﬁled in six particularly favor-
able jurisdictions, plaintiﬀs’ expected returns from trial increase by $800,000 to nearly $4 million. See Proposition
3 for an argument as to why these (and similar) estimates may underestimate the impact of forum shopping.












The above expression takes into account the fact that for debtors sticking with their natural venue
[which occurs with frequency 1−fρ,β0 (α,c)]t h eﬁrm is reorganized with probability xβ0 (ρ),w h i l e
for debtors forum shopping to pro-debtor courts [which occurs with frequency fρ,β0 (α,c)]t h eﬁrm
is reorganized with probability one.
In this context, it is natural to characterize the systematic bias of bankruptcy outcomes induced
by forum shopping as the diﬀerence between expression (2) and the aggregate share of rerganizations
Eβ,ρ[xβ (ρ)] obtained under random allocation of ﬁrms to bankruptcy courts. Forum shopping then
generates a systematic pro-debtor (resp. pro-creditor) bias when the diﬀerence is positive (resp.
negative). When the diﬀerence is zero, forum shopping does not generate any systematic bias. It
is thus straightforward to ﬁnd:
Proposition 2 When debtors ﬁle for bankruptcy, forum shopping creates a systematic pro-debtor
bias even if bankruptcy judges are on average unbiased.
By promoting forum shopping by debtors, judicial discretion in bankruptcy should, ceteris
paribus, be associated with an increase in the aggregate bias in the resolution of ﬁnancial dis-
tress.13 In this sense, our demand and supply framework can reconcile judicial discretion with the
systematic biases of court-supervised bankruptcy procedures, not only with idiosyncratic variation
across courts.
This result is the starting point of our analysis. In Section 4 we show that this demand and
supply framework yields several interesting comparative statics results, which in Section 6 we argue
can parsimoniously rationalize a wealth of evidence on the resolution of ﬁnancial distress in the
U.S. and elsewhere. Before moving to those comparative statics, we present a dynamic version of
our model where we derive a dynamic supply eﬀect that accounts for additional empirical facts.
13Looking at the entire population of courts and ﬁrms, the aggregate reorganization policy is unbiased if
Eβ,ρ[xβ (ρ)] = 1/2 (as 1/2 is the total share of reorganizations in the ﬁr s tb e s t ) . I ti si m m e d i a t et oc h e c kt h a t
for this to be the case it must hold that Pr(β ≤ βρ)=P r ( β ≥ βρ), namely the number of pro-creditor courts must
be equal to the number of pro-debtor courts.
93 The Supply of Bias under Career Concerns
Besides shaping the demand for biased adjudication, debtors’ forum shopping may also aﬀect its
supply by aﬀecting the incentives of courts to use their discretion in a pro-debtor manner. To see
how this works, assume that bankruptcy courts beneﬁt not only from trying current cases, but also
from attracting future ones. A court attracting many ﬁlings may be viewed as more prestigious, it
may allow the judge to choose the "best" case and obtain for example more coverage in the press,
but it may also aﬀect more mundane incentives such as increase the revenue of local bankruptcy
lawyers as well as the judge’s probability of re-election (Lo Pucki 2005). In a survey of bankruptcy
judges, Cole (2002) ﬁnds that "almost all of the judges suggested that there is a level of prestige
and satisfaction that attaches to hearing and deciding important cases. Big Chapter 11 cases are
interesting as well as prestigious."
In such a world, judges have an incentive to use their discretion to establish a favorable repu-
tation and thus attract future cases, very much like in Holmström’s (1999) career concern model.
Formally, assume that there are two periods and debtors do not observe the courts’ intrinsic pro-






. Among all cases adjudicated




] represents the total share of ﬁrms with reor-
ganization value ρ (resp. ρ)t h a tc o u r tβj decided to reorganize. Then, after observing x1,βj,






. Based on these inferences, in the second period debtors decide where to ﬁle,
judges choose x2,βj and the game ends. Given this timing, at t =2each court will play its statically
optimal strategy of Section 2. We assume that future ﬁlings aﬀect the judge’s utility as in (1), and
that judges discount the future by a factor γ ≤ 1. While parsimonious, this last assumption is not
important. Our main results would go through also under the assumption that judges’ utility from
trying future cases is ﬁxed and independent from the court’s adjudication policy.
For ease of exposition, suppose that there is an equal proportion of pro-creditor courts with




and of pro-debtor courts with β ≥ βρ.T h e r e i s a
population of measure one of failed debtors and a share 1/3 of them is naturally allocated to each
court type. Do pro-debtor and pro-creditor courts have an incentive to always reorganize so as to
mimic pro-debtor courts and avoid losing future cases? We ﬁnd that:
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold γ (α,c),w i t hγ (α,c) ≤ 1,i n c r e a s i n gi nα and c such
that, for γ>γ (α,c) all courts always adjudicate like pro-debtor ones. If instead γ ≤ γ (α,c)
10the equilibrium is separating. In particular, there is a threshold e γ (α,c),w i t he γ (α,c) ≤ γ (α,c),
increasing in α and c such that for γ<e γ (α,c) there is full separation: each court adjudicates
according to its own preferences and no systematic pro-debtor bias arises.
The proof is in Appendix 1. Under judicial discretion debtors’ forum shopping may be a
suﬃcient condition to trigger a pro-debtor adjudication, irrespective of a court’s intrinsic preferences
for the debtor or the creditor. The intuition is that now even unbiased or pro-creditor courts have
an incentive to adjudicate in a pro-debtor manner to establish a reputation for being pro-debtor
and thus attract future cases, especially if attracting future cases is valuable (i.e. if γ high).
To illustrate this eﬀect, consider ﬁrst the debtors’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs we used to prove
Proposition 3. We assumed that a court reorganizing in ρ but sometimes liquidating in ρ (i.e.
setting x1 (ρ)=1 ,x 1(ρ) < 1), is believed to be unbiased, while a court liquidating some ﬁrms
both in ρ and in ρ (i.e. setting x1 (ρ) < 1,x 1(ρ) < 1) is believed to be pro-creditor. These
beliefs are consistent with the fact that it is statically optimal for unbiased courts to reorganize
in ρ but not in ρ and also that it is statically optimal for pro-creditor courts to always liquidate.
Finally, courts following a "crazy" policy entailing some liquidations in ρ but not in ρ (i.e. setting
x1 (ρ) < 1,x 1(ρ)=1 ), are believed to be pro-creditor, as they can neither be pro-debtor nor
unbiased.14
Consider now the dilemma faced in the ﬁrst period by an unbiased court in a pooling equilibrium
where all courts behave in a pro-debtor fashion. Under the stated out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the
best deviation for such a court would be to signal its unbiasedness by setting x1(ρ)=0 , x1 (ρ)=1 .
Indeed, the court would neither beneﬁt by setting x1(ρ) > 0 nor x1 (ρ) < 1.I n t h e ﬁrst case,
the court would still be believed to be unbiased, thus only bearing the static loss associated with
reorganizing some unproﬁtable ﬁrms. In the second case, the court would instead be perceived as
pro-creditor, thus bearing both the static loss of liquidating some proﬁtable ﬁrms and the dynamic
loss of losing future ﬁlings by proﬁtable ﬁrms. It turns out that an unbiased court prefers to behave
14These out-of-equilibrium beliefs allow us to show in the starkest way how forum shopping can create an incentive
for unbiased or pro-creditor courts to establish a pro-debtor reputation. Of course, given the well known multiplicity
of equilibria in signalling games, diﬀerent equilibria can be supported by alternative out-of-equilibrium beliefs. It is
beyond the scope of the paper to fully evaluate the possibility for these alternative equilibria and their form. However,
it is likely that in some equilibrium pro-creditor and unbiased courts may tilt their t =1adjudication towards the
debtor without fully converging to x1 (ρ)=1 ,x 1(ρ)=1[such as when a court is believed pro-debtor whenever its
adjudication is x1 (ρ)=1 ,x 1(ρ) ≥ δ with δ>0]. But there might also be "perverse" equilibria where all courts have
an incentive to behave in a somewhat pro-creditor manner. For instance, a pooling pro-creditor equilibrium where
all courts adjudicate according to x1 (ρ)=0 ,x 1(ρ)=0could be sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs whereby only
courts adjudicating in favor of creditors at t =1are believed to be pro-debtor. We do not feel the latter type of
equilibria to be very realistic.
11in a pro-debtor manner rather than to act in a statically optimal manner provided:
γλfρ,β0<βρ (α,c) ≥ λ − ρ (3)
The left hand side of (3) is the future discounted payoﬀ the unbiased court derives from adjudicating
in a pro-debtor manner. Such payoﬀ obtains from liquidating in period 2 am e a s u r efρ,β0<βρ (α,c)
of ﬁrms with poor prospects. Indeed, those ﬁrms would have ﬁl e di np r o - d e b t o rc o u r t sh a dt h e y
known this one was unbiased. The right hand side of (3) is the static cost for the unbiased court of
reorganizing ﬁrms with poor prospects. If forum shopping is suﬃciently widespread and the judge
is suﬃciently patient, then he will prefer to pool with the other pro-debtor courts rather than to
separate but lose future cases.15
As a result, debtors’ forum shopping can generate a systematic pro-debtor bias even absent any
courts’ idiosyncratic pro-debtor preferences. Thus, under judicial discretion forum shopping may
generate a systematic pro-debtor bias not only by sorting — on the demand side — cases into pro-
debtor courts, but also by giving — on the supply side — judges the incentive to use their discretion
in a pro-debtor manner.
A robust insight of our model is thus that simple comparisons of bankruptcy outcomes across
courts may fail to empirically identify the extent of the systematic bias induced by judicial dis-
cretion, because career concerns give all courts an incentive to rule in favor of debtors.A s a n
illustration, consider a strategy to estimate the consequences of forum shopping (to Delaware, say)
on bankruptcy outcomes by regressing ﬁrm level outcomes such as the probability of reorganiza-
tion on a dummy for Delaware and other control variables, and then interpreting the coeﬃcient
on Delaware as the eﬀect of forum shopping (LoPucki 2005, Ayotte and Skeel 2004; see also Elul
and Subramanian 2002, White 2006). Proposition 3 warns that this strategy is likely to severely
underestimate the total eﬀect of forum shopping, because such regression overlooks the extent to
which all courts have an incentive to rule in favor of debtors. A more eﬀective strategy may thus
be to focus on bankruptcy outcomes in a court that is shielded from forum shopping for some
exogenous reasons.
15The proof shows that a similar reasoning holds with respect to a pro-creditor court. Notice that in a pooling
equilibrium there is no proﬁtable way for a pro-debtor court to separate itself from other court types. For example,
if pro-debtor courts start ruling for the creditors, then — given the assumed out of equilibrium beliefs — they are
confused with pro-creditor courts so that, in addition to bearing a static loss, their future caseload is also reduced.
124 Comparative Statics and Welfare
We now study the impact of creditor protection α, legal restrictions to forum shopping c and other
parameters on the equilibrium supply and demand of judicial discretion in both our static and
dynamic models. Section 4.1 focuses on forum shopping, Section 4.2 on the systematic bias of
bankruptcy outcomes, and Section 4.3 on social welfare.
4.1 Creditor Protection, Filing Restrictions and Forum Shopping
We start by studying the determinants of the demand for biased adjudication. By deriving the
expression for fρ,β0 (α,c) it is immediate to ﬁnd:
Corollary 1 In the static model forum shopping by debtors falls in α and c. In the career concerns
model, however, increases in α and c shifting the equilibrium from pooling to separating cause a
discontinuous increase in forum shopping in the second period. In the career concerns model second
period forum shopping (weakly) falls in γ.
Intuitively, the demand for pro-debtor courts depends negatively on both the strictness of ﬁling
rules c and on the strength of creditor protection in reorganization α, as both parameters reduce
the debtors’ net beneﬁt from forum shopping. As a result, in the static model increases in α and
c reduce observed forum shopping. While the demand eﬀects of α and c also hold within the
separating equilibrium in the career concerns model, they do not imply that also in our dynamic
setup increases in α and c always reduce forum shopping. In contrast, increases in α and c triggering
a shift from the pooling to the separating equilibrium will reduce observed forum shopping. An
immediate implication of Proposition 3, this result is due to a feedback between the supply and
demand side of the model: if α and c are so high that γ(α,c) ≥ γ, then debtors have little incentives
to forum shop and courts will separate at t =1 , in turn inducing more forum shopping at t =2 .
If instead α and c are so low that γ(α,c) <γ , then debtors have strong incentives to forum shop
and courts pool at t =1 , with no forum shopping taking place in equilibrium at t =2 .T h u s ,
although an increase in creditor protection and legal restrictions often reduce forum shopping, in
general the eﬀect is ambiguous. Finally, in the career concerns model forum shopping also depends
on judges’ discount rate γ. When judges attach a large value to attracting future cases, then a
pooling equilibrium is likely to arise at t =1 , which in turn reduces the amount of observed forum
shopping at t =2 .
13Our model can also yield insights on which ﬁrms are to be expected to forum shop depending
on their reorganization value. Should we expect the best or the worst ﬁrms to forum shop in equi-
librium? Answering this question is key for attempts to estimate empirically the reorganization
ability of judges, as self-selection of ﬁrms into bankruptcy courts may be a potential source of
bias. For simplicity, assume that ρ<c , so that the fraction of ﬁrms engaging in forum shop-
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itable ﬁrms. These expressions show that two conﬂicting eﬀects are at work. On the one hand,
forum shopping incentives increase in the debtors’ rents from control, so one should expect the
most proﬁtable ﬁrms to forum shop (the demand eﬀect). On the other hand, forum shopping in-
centives increase in the likelihood that the ﬁrm is liquidated under its natural venue, so one should
expect the least proﬁtable ﬁrms to forum shop (the supply eﬀect). The set of bankruptcy ﬁlings
disproportionately consists of ﬁrms with poor prospects if and only if the supply eﬀect dominates.
To see this, assume that there is an equal share x of pro-debtor and pro-creditor courts. Then





Intuitively, if only few courts are biased, then the most proﬁtable ﬁrms will be reorganized even in
their natural venue. As a result, the supply eﬀect dominates because unproﬁtable ﬁrms will still
have strong incentives to forum shop away from a near-certain liquidation under unbiased courts.
If instead many courts are biased, then the opposite is true because the least proﬁtable ﬁrms
now stand a chance to be reorganized under their natural venue. As a result, the demand eﬀect
dominates as proﬁtable ﬁrms will disproportionately try to forum shop away from a near-certain
liquidation under pro-creditor courts.
This discussion suggests that attempts to estimate the reorganization ability of courts should
properly control for the above mentioned demand and supply eﬀects. For example, if the pre-
eminent courts such as Delaware disproportionately attract ﬁrms with poor prospects, then the
costs of pro-debtor bias are likely to be vastly exaggerated because the ﬁrms managed by these
courts are not a representative sample of the population of distressed ﬁrms.16 The opposite is true
16This is especially the case if the liquidation value is itself stochastic but perfectly correlated with the reorganization




<λ(ρ)=λ<ρ). In this case, evaluating the social costs of over-reorganization by using




/2 may severely overestimate such costs because it does not take the
14if proﬁtable ﬁrms disproportionately engage in forum shopping.
4.2 Judicial Incentives and Creditor Protection
Consider now the determinants of the systematic bias of bankruptcy outcomes. The previous
analysis implies:
Proposition 4 In both the static and the career concern models, the systematic pro-debtor bias of
bankruptcy falls in α. The systematic pro-debtor bias falls also in c.
Crucially, creditor protection in reorganization improves the workings of judicial discretion.17
Before proving why this is the case, it is worth stressing that our result does not hinge on artiﬁcially
assuming that creditor protection reduces judicial discretion. Throughout our analysis we hold the
extent of judicial discretion constant by assuming that the judge controls the reorganization v.
liquidation decision. In our model higher creditor protection only reduces the ability of judges
to redistribute resources in favor of debtors by reorganizing bankrupt ﬁrms, thereby aﬀecting the
incentives of judges to use their discretion in a pro-reorganization or pro-liquidation manner.
This result combines two supply eﬀects and one demand eﬀect.T h e ﬁrst dynamic supply
eﬀect arises in the career concerns model, where higher α makes it more likely that a separating
equilibrium with no systematic bias arises as opposed to a pooling equilibrium where all judges
behave in a pro-debtor fashion. The intuition is that, anticipating lower future demand, unbiased
judges have fewer incentives to establish a pro-debtor reputation, thereby reducing systematic bias.
But even within separating equilibria (or for that matter in the static model), higher α reduces
systematic bias. On the demand side, higher creditor protection reduces debtors’ incentive to forum
shop, which in turn directly reduces the systematic pro-debtor bias by dampening the sorting of
cases in pro-debtor courts. On the supply side, higher creditor protection also exerts a direct
eﬀect on adjudication by rendering even highly pro-debtor judges less willing to over-reorganize a
bankrupt ﬁrm. This static suppy eﬀect can be gauged by noticing that an increase in α increases βρ
and decreases βρ, thereby expanding the region where judges implement the ﬁrst best. Because with
high creditor protection debtors end up getting very little anyway, there is little or no reason even
for highly pro-debtor courts to signiﬁcantly distort the decision whether to reorganize or liquidate
selection of bad ﬁr m si n t oa c c o u n t .
17In the context of the career concerns model, the above proposition clearly focuses on the systematic bias emerging
at t =1 , given that only such systematic bias is aﬀected by the career concerns of bankruptcy judges.
15the ﬁrm. In the limit where α =1this eﬀect is so strong that all courts behave like unbiased
ones. At this point, courts’ preferences for debtors or creditors no longer aﬀect their resolution of
ﬁnancial distress, which becomes fully eﬃcient.



























βρ < 0 (5)
The formula takes into account that fρ,βρ (α,c)=0(namely, debtors always stick with court βρ,
the least pro-debtor one among those always reorganizing). The ﬁr s tt e r mo ft h ea b o v ee x p r e s s i o n
is negative because forum shopping (weakly) falls when creditor protection increases. This is the
demand eﬀect. But also the second term is negative because higher creditor protection reduces the
threshold βρ, as fewer judges are willing to act in a pro-debtor manner. This is the static supply
eﬀect.
In sum, creditor protection in reorganization prevents a "race to the bottom" whereby judicial
discretion generates a pro-debtor bias in the resolution of ﬁnancial distress. When creditor protec-
tion is low, forum shopping by debtors is widespread and judges have strong incentives to distort
the resolution of ﬁnancial distress. When creditor protection is high, debtors’ forum shopping falls
and judges’ incentives become more aligned with social eﬃciency. Proposition 4 also shows that
similar eﬀects are associated with increases in the legal restrictions on forum shopping c.Ah i g h e r
c reduces forum shopping, dampening both debtors’ demand for biased adjudication and judges’
incentives to establish a pro-debtor reputation.
More generally, our demand and supply analysis shows that under judicial discretion, creditor
protection in reorganization and legal restrictions to forum shopping may be crucial determinants
of observed diﬀerences in the resolution of ﬁnancial distress under diﬀerent codes or over time under
the same code. To the best of our knowledge, this hypothesis has not been articulated before.
In Section 6 we argue that this hypothesis may help rationalize a wealth of empirical evidence on
bankruptcy outcomes in the U.S.
4.3 Welfare Analysis
We now derive some welfare properties of our model. We focus on ex post welfare and leave ex
ante issues to Appendix 2. To simplify the algebra, from now on we assume:
16Assumption 1: c>ρ.
This (reasonable) assumption implies that, at every reorganization value ρ and at any natural
venue β0,t h e r ea r es o m eﬁrms for which it is too costly to forum shop. It is then easy to ﬁnd:




/E (ρ).E xp o s ts o c i a lw e l f a r et e n d st oEβ,ρ{λ + xβ (ρ)(ρ − λ)} as c →∞and to (λ + ρ)/2
as α → 1.
The proof is in the Appendix. This result has two implications. First, forum shopping by
debtors is detrimental when the social losses of over-reorganization are suﬃciently large. Thus, if λ
is suﬃciently large, increases in c and α improve welfare. Second, increasing creditor protection α is
more eﬀective than increasing restrictions to forum shopping c. This result is due to the static supply
eﬀect:ah i g h e rα reduces, ceteris paribus, the extent to which judges distort the reorganization
v. liquidation decision. If creditor protection is highest (i.e. α =1 ), all judges have an incentive
to adjudicate in an unbiased manner, thereby yielding a ﬁrst-best eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial
distress. Parameter c does not trigger this eﬀect as it aﬀect judges’ incentives only indirectly,
via forum shopping. Thus, if forum shopping is forbidden altogether (i.e. if c →∞ ), some ﬁrms
will be stuck in biased courts and thus society will bear the costs of judicial idiosyncrasies. More
broadly, this result suggests that increasing legal restrictions to forum shopping may not be the
most eﬀective way to improve the workings of judicial discretion because such restrictions could
also prevent some beneﬁcial forum shopping to take place. The next section formalizes this last
point.
5 Additional Demand and Supply Shifters
We now study three extensions to our basic setup. Section 5.1 studies the eﬀect of forum shopping
when judges diﬀer also in speed, not only in bias. Section 5.2 studies the case where also creditors,
not only debtors, may be able to forum shop with positive probability. Section 5.3 studies the case
where judges perceive a noisy signal of the ﬁrm’s reorganization value. In Section 6 we will discuss
how the demand and supply shifters of Sections 4 and 5 can help account for the empirical evidence
on U.S. bankruptcy outcomes.
175.1 Courts’ Speed and Potential Beneﬁts of Forum Shopping
Besides diﬀering in bias, suppose that courts diﬀer also in their speed, which proxies for the dead-
weight costs of their decision-making. A court can be slow or fast. A slow court delays the resolution
of ﬁnancial distress, generating for the parties only δλ in case of liquidation and δρ in case of reor-
ganization [the debtor still retains a share (1 − α) of reorganization proceeds], where δ<1 captures
the depreciation of ﬁrms’ assets occurring during bankruptcy. A fast court resolves ﬁnancial distress
quickly, yielding to the parties the same payoﬀs as in Section 2.1.
Relative to the previous model, forum shopping can now arise both towards courts with the same
bias but diﬀerent speed levels and towards courts with diﬀerent biases and speed levels. Suppose
that there are three types of judges — pro creditor, pro-debtor and unbiased — and that a fraction
ϕ of courts is fast while the rest is slow. We assume that speed is uncorrelated with bias, as there
is no particular reason to assume otherwise.18
Consider the full information version of this model. Call δ0 ∈ {δ,1} the speed of the natural
venue. For algebraic simplicity set δ =0 . Then, a debtor whose ﬁrm has reorganization value ρ
forum shops to fast, pro-debtor courts if x ≤ (1 − α)ρ
£
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.T h u s , t h e s h a r e o f ﬁrms
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.I ti se a s yt oﬁnd:
Proposition 5 Forum shopping creates a systematic pro-debtor bias which falls in c. Social welfare
falls in c,e v e ni fλ ≥ E
¡
ρ2¢
/E (ρ).F u l le xp o s te ﬃciency is attained at α =1and c =0 .
The proof is in the Appendix. A systematic pro-debtor bias continues to arise, as debtors now
forum shop to fast, pro-debtor courts, not to unbiased ones.19 Accordingly, the systematic pro-
debtor bias falls in c. More interestingly, Proposition 5 shows that when courts diﬀer in speed
and not only in bias, forum shopping is beneﬁcial (the proof shows that this is especially the case
if the proportion of fast judges is not very large). Indeed, if many courts are slow, forum shopping
to fast courts reduces social deadweight costs, thereby improving welfare. One consequence of
this idea is that now attaining ex post eﬃciency requires both strong creditor protection — which
18Our main results (especially those obtained under symmetric information) continue to hold if unbiased judges
tend to be faster than the others.
19Notice that qualitatively similar results hold for δ>0. In particular, although in that case forum shopping
would not always be beneﬁcial, the proof of Proposition 5 shows that one would generally expect forum shopping to
be beneﬁcial provided the total proportion of slow courts ϕ is suﬃciently large. With δ>0, even assuming perfect
correlation between speed and (lack of) bias, that is only fast courts are unbiased and viceversa, there would still
be debtors willing to forum shop to slow but favorable courts because when the ﬁrm has reorganization value ρ the
debtor always prefers a slow reorganization rather than a fast liquidation.
18reduces courts’ pro-debtor bias — and perfect forum shopping, which minimizes deadweight costs.
This result stands in sharp contrast with Corollary 2: provided creditors are protected enough in
reorganization, when courts also diﬀer in their ability forum shopping does not generate bias but is
instead needed to attain a ﬁrst-best resolution of ﬁnancial distress! In this sense, we conﬁrm that
creditor protection is likely to be more eﬀective than legal restrictions to forum shopping: provided
creditor protection is large enough, competition among bankruptcy courts to attract more ﬁlings
can generate a "race to the top" towards more eﬃcient resolutions of ﬁnancial distress.
Consider now the career concern version of this model where debtors are uninformed about the
biases of diﬀerent courts but perfectly informed about their speed. Does heterogeneity in speed
reduce or increase the possibility to attain a pooling equilibrium where all courts adjudicate in a
pro-debtor fashion? We obtain:
Proposition 6 Suppose that ϕ =1 /2. Then, for given γ,α and c, a pooling equilibrium where all
courts adjudicate in a pro-debtor fashion in the ﬁrst period is more likely to arise than in the career
concern model where all judges are fast (i.e. where δ =1or ϕ =0 ).
Relative to the model of Section 3.2, heterogeneity in courts’ speed creates some forum shopping
also in the "pro-debtor" pooling equilibrium (both in the ﬁrst and second period), from slow to
fast bankruptcy venues. This new feature creates an incentive for unbiased and pro-creditor fast
courts to deviate from the "pro-debtor" equilibrium and play their static optimum, as their speed
would enable them to attract cases anyway. However, there is also a countervailing eﬀect: because
more debtors (even those who ended up in a pro-debtor but slow court) will now engage in forum
shopping, there is a stronger incentive for courts to pool because they can attract more cases in
the future. In other words, when only some courts are fast the dynamic supply eﬀect is stronger.
Because this last eﬀect turns out to dominate, our model suggests that the introduction of more
competent (or less competent) courts in the population may actually enhance the possibility for a
pooling, pro-debtor equilibrium to emerge.20
20As Proposition 6 shows, we proved this result for δ =0and ϕ =1 /2. It is much harder to solve for the
pooling equilibrium under more general conditions, particularly because for δ>0 the number of incentive constraints
increases substantially. Nevertheless, there appear to be reasons to believe that also the case where δ>0 should
naturally go in the same direction as Proposition 6. Indeed, if δ>0 debtors have less to gain from forum shopping
to fast courts, so that even slow courts may hope to attract cases by signalling their pro-debtor stance. In turn, this
eﬀect reduces the incentive of fast courts to deviate from the pooling equilibrium.
195.2 Forum Shopping by Debtors and Creditors
We now change the model of Section 2 by assuming that with probability p the debtor controls the
bankruptcy venue choice while with probability 1 − p the creditor is in control, where p ∈ (0,1).21
When debtors are in control we already know that at natural venue β0 the share of ﬁrms with
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where d stands for "debtor". If instead the creditor is in control he will, if anything, forum shop
to pro-creditor courts. If the distribution of forum shopping costs is the same for creditors and
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stands for "creditor". Notice that we assumed that creditors’ and debtors’ forum shopping costs
are drawn from potentially diﬀerent uniform distributions. In particular, debtors’ forum shopping
cost is on average lower than the creditors’ if and only if cd <c k.W et h e nﬁnd:
Proposition 7 With p>0, forum shopping allocates ﬁrms to both pro-creditor and pro-debtor
judges. There exists a threshold p∗ such that forum shopping creates a systematic pro-debtor bias
if and only if p ≥ p∗,w h e r ep∗ falls in ck/cd. The systematic (pro-creditor or pro-debtor) bias falls
in ck + cd.
The proof is in the Appendix. When also creditors can forum shop we will observe many cases
being distributed among very pro-creditor and very pro-debtor courts. Such an allocation will cause
not only the reorganization of unproﬁtable businesses but also the liquidation of many viable ﬁrms.
In turn, the ﬁrst outcome is more likely to prevail, and thus the systematic bias is more likely to
be pro-debtor, the higher is the probability p that the debtor is in control.22
It is useful at this point to focus on the case α ≤ λ/ρ (the Appendix shows that similar results








21Notice that creditor ﬁling does not imply the possibility of a creditors’ run but only represents the possibility for
them to decide on the bankruptcy venue. In our model, what rules out creditors’ runs is the fact that we assume the
existence of a state-mandated bankruptcy procedure. Put diﬀerently, creditor runs on the ﬁrm’s assets could only
occur in the absence of such procedure (Hart 1995, 2000).
22Although we do not formally study the career concern model under the assumption that also creditors can forum
shop, it is reasonable to expect that for high p reputational forces will push towards a pro-debtor pooling equilibrium,
while the opposite is likely to occur at low p.F o r p close to 1/2 (and for ck close to cd), in equilibrium pro-debtor
and pro-creditor courts are likely to separate while unbiased courts will choose between pooling with the former or
the latter, depending on both the relative demand faced by these courts as well as on the average attractiveness of
liquidation relative to reorganization (i.e. on whether E(ρ) ≶ λ).
20Expression (6) intuitively shows that whether the systematic bias turns out to be pro-debtor or pro-
creditor crucially depends on the relative extent to which debtors, as opposed to creditors, forum
shop on average. In particular, for a given probability p of debtor control, the systematic bias is
more likely to be pro-debtor as long as debtors on average engage more in forum shopping than
creditors. This observation highlights the potential role of diﬀerences in the cost of forum shopping.
For it is the party for which forum shopping is cheaper that drives the demand for biased courts
and thus systematic bias, not necessarily the party more often controlling the bankruptcy venue
decision. For example, the systematic bias could still be pro-debtor even if p is small, provided
ck/cd is suﬃciently large.23
5.3 Estimation Uncertainty
We now consider what happens if bankruptcy proceedings produce a noisy estimate of the ﬁrm’s
reorganization value. This extension allows us to obtain empirical predictions on how the resolution
of ﬁnancial distress should vary across ﬁrms. The idea is that mature ﬁr m sw i t hm o r es t a b l ec a s h
ﬂows should generate less uncertainty about their reorganization value than younger, innovative,
"growth" ﬁrms with more volatile cash ﬂows. The court now observes a noisy signal r of the
ﬁrm’s reorganization value, where r is normally distributed with mean ρ and variance θ2.W ec a l l
θ "estimation uncertainty" because it measures the noise with which outsiders (i.e. courts) assess
the ﬁrm’s reorganization value.24 After observing r, the court chooses the probability x(r) with
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As in the basic model, the court maximizes a weighted sum of the parties’ payoﬀs but now this
objective is averaged using the conditional distribution of ρ with respect to r.I t i s e a s y t o ﬁnd
that court j reorganizes the ﬁrm (i.e. sets x(r)=1 ) if and only if r ≥ rβj,w h e r e :




βj (1 − α)ρ +( αρ − λ)
(λ − αρ) − βj (1 − α)ρ
(8)
23Empirically, one reason for expecting ck/cd to be large is that it is likely to be easier for the debtor to transfer
his headquarters near his favorite court to be able to claim that such court is the natural venue. This arguments are
of course magniﬁed in the presence of multiple creditors who can potentially disagree on their own favorite court.
24While one may interpret θ also as a measure of the court’s experience with similar implications, in what follows
we stress the estimation uncertainty interpretation because it generates testable predictions for ﬁrm level resolutions
of ﬁnancial distress.
21Estimation uncertainty is relevant only if
βj(1−α)ρ+(αρ−λ)
(λ−αρ)−βj(1−α)ρ ∈ (0,∞),w h i c hi st h ec a s ei fβj ∈
(βmin,βmax) where βmin < 1 <β max are two suitable thresholds. Court j reorganizes a ﬁrm
worth ρ with probability Pr(r>r j |ρ).S i n c er Ã N
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,w h e r eΦ(.) is the standard normal c.d.f. As in Section 2, the probability of
reorganization increases in βj and in ρ.
Assume for algebraic simplicity that the ex post social cost of over- and under-liquidation are
equal, i.e. ρ − λ = λ − ρ. Then, the impact of θ on the reorganization policy depends on judicial
bias βj. In particular, we obtain:
Proposition 8 Ah i g h e rθ increases the probability of reorganization if and only if βj > 1.A
higher θ reduces repayment if βj > 1.
The proof is in the Appendix. Estimation uncertainty θ magniﬁes the role of bias. Courts
cater even more to their own preferences when a ﬁrm’s reorganization value is more noisy. The
intuition is that in highly uncertain environments (when θ is large) courts are aware of making
many mistakes and prefer to cater to their own bias than to err against their preferred party. Thus,
ah i g h e rθ induces more liquidations if the court is pro-creditor (βj < 1) and more reorganizations
if the court is pro-debtor (βj > 1). As a result, repayment is also lower, especially with pro-debtor
courts. Section 6.2 discusses the empirical implications of this ﬁnding for the cross section of ﬁrms.
6 Discussion of Empirical Evidence on U.S. Chapter 11
A rapidly growing empirical literature documents the importance of individual judges in shaping
the resolution of ﬁnancial distress in U.S. Chapter 11. For example, it has been shown that
judicial idiosyncrasies (e.g. Weiss and Wruck 1998), judges’ identity (e.g. Chang and Schoar 2006)
and bankruptcy venue (Bris, Welch, and Zhu 2006) matter for outcomes such as extensions of
exclusivity, probability of reorganization, repayment to creditors and violations of priority. The
supply side of our model of judicial discretion is obviously consistent with these ﬁndings.25
25Our model also yields the prediction, consistent with evidence from Chang and Schoar (2006) that a higher βj
also increases the probability of a bankruptcy re-ﬁling, i.e. the probability that a recently reorganized ﬁrm ﬁles
again for bankruptcy. However, the interpretation given to re-ﬁling depends on speciﬁc assumptions. For example,
if in reorganization corporate debt is restructured to a face value of αρ, the debtor is doomed to default and ﬁle for
bankruptcy again, because he cannot repay more than αρ.I nt h i sc a s e ,r e - ﬁling is a symptom of over-reorganization,
consistent with Lo Pucki and Kalin (2001). On the other hand, if in state ρ there is uncertainty about the future
reorganization value (which can either be ve r yh i g ho rv e r yl o wb u tw i t ha v e r a g ev a l u eρ), then re-ﬁling will again
be inevitable but not symptomatic of ineﬃciency, consistent with Ayotte and Skeel (2004).
22Besides explaining the cross-court variation of bankruptcy outcomes, the demand side of our
model also helps rationalize the kind of systematic biases in the resolution of ﬁnancial distress
prevailing under diﬀerent bankruptcy codes and documented by bankruptcy scholars (Skeel 2001,
Franks and Torous 1989, 1993). The mechanism leading judicial discretion to produce such a
systematic bias in our model is forum shopping by debtors. Consistent with our model, not only is
forum shopping widespread in the U.S., but in the 1980s it mainly rewarded the New York district,
where judge Burton R. Liﬂand and his colleagues were known to be strongly pro-debtor. Forbes
magazine described Judge Liﬂand “A Bankrupt’s Best Friend,” [Forbes, April 1, 1991, pp. 99-102,
see also Weiss and Wruck (1998)]. The New York court alone attracted 32% of the Chapter 11
cases in the 1980s (LoPucki and Whitford 1991, Lo Pucki 2005). More recently, the Delaware court
took over, attracting 43% (31 out of 72) of large bankruptcies between 1993 and 1996 (LoPucki and
Whitford 1991, LoPucki and Doherty 2002). Some scholars argue that the Delaware court is itself
pro-debtor (e.g. Lo Pucki 2005)26, others instead stress that the Delaware court mainly attracted
ﬁrms thanks to its ability to handle complex cases eﬀectively (Ayotte and Skeel 2004).
Our demand and supply framework can contribute to this empirical debate with two observa-
tions. First, the empirical methodology used in this debate (which directly compares bankruptcy
outcomes in New York and Delaware with those in other U.S. courts) may be unsuited to detect the
systematic bias created by forum shopping. Papers in this literature tipically regress various bank-
ruptcy outcomes (reorganization probabilities, recovery rates, and so on) on a dummy that equals
one for Delaware ﬁlings, and other controls. The debate is then often on whether the coeﬃcient on
t h ed u m m yf o rD e l a w a r ei sp o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant, in which case it is argued that forum shopping
matters for bankruptcy outcomes. However, as shown in Section 3, such cross-courts comparisons
fail to account for judicial incentives and thus for the uniform increase in courts’ pro-debtor stance
triggered by debtors’ forum shopping. In other words, the coeﬃcient on Delaware may well be
zero, but that does not imply that forum shopping does not aﬀect bankruptcy outcomes.
Second, our model of Section 5.1 illustrates the role of judicial competence in shaping the
dynamics of forum shopping. At one level, our model suggests that the increasingly important role
of Delaware may be due to an over-time trend in the complexity and/or sophistication of ﬁrms’ debt
26LoPucki stresses that one dimension along which the Delaware and other courts have been particularly pro-debtor
is the appointment of a trustee. Although §1104 of the U.S. code states that "the court shall order the appointment
of a trustee for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the aﬀairs of the debtor
by current management, either before or after the commencement of the case," substantial ﬂexibility is left to judges
to determine whether those conditions apply. However, U.S. courts have almost never appointed trustees, not even
in such famous bankruptcy cases of corporate fraud as Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing and Adelphia.
23structures, increasing ﬁrms’ incentive to ﬁle in more competent courts. It may well be the case that
the Delaware court is faster and more eﬀective at dealing with conﬂicts among multiple creditors
(Ayotte and Skeel 2004). However the model of Section 5.1 shows that — unless a court’s expertise
and its unbiasedness are positively correlated — this selection of ﬁrms into more competent courts
does not necessarily imply a reduction in systematic pro-debtor bias. Indeed, Proposition 6 suggests
that the ability of more competent bankruptcy courts such as Delaware to attract bankruptcy cases
in the 1990s may have actually boosted the incentives of these courts to act in a pro-debtor manner
by increasing their potential future demand. Our model instead suggests that a systematic pro-
debtor bias should be more sensitive to shifts in variables such as creditor control of the bankruptcy
venue, managerial turnover in bankruptcy and violations of priority.
6.1 Recent Developments of U.S. Bankruptcy
Our demand and supply model can also shed light on two recent changes in the pro-debtor bias of
U.S. bankruptcy outcomes. First, Skeel (2001) documents a marked increase in pro-debtor bias after
the introduction of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Second, Baird and Rasmussen (2003) document a
marked reduction in the pro-debtor bias of U.S. bankruptcy courts around year 2001.
Consider the ﬁrst fact. To begin, it is important to notice that the surge in forum shopping took
place shortly after the introduction of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code - indeed, there are no accounts
of forum shopping before the early 1980s. One explanation for this fact that is consistent with
our model is that the 1978 bankruptcy reform increased judicial discretion (Skeel 2001), eﬀectively
increasing debtors’ incentives to forum shop.27
Turning to the second fact, it has been argued that the pro-debtor stance of U.S. bankruptcy
courts has decreased substantially since 2001. For example, Chapter 11 seems to no longer provide
a safe harbor for failed managers, as 80% of CEOs are replaced within two years of the bankruptcy
ﬁling (Ayotte and Morrison 2007), and liquidations appear to be far more common after 2001 than
in the past (Adler et al. 2006). Interestingly, also judicial attitudes seem to have changed, as
judges have become more likely to approve liquidation of bankrupt ﬁrms, thereby inducing a zero
return to pre-bankruptcy shareholders (Adler et al. 2006).
Puzzlingly, this marked shift in the workings of Chapter 11 has occurred in the absence of any
27For example, Skeel (2001) argues that, with respect to the Chandler Act of 1938, the 1978 code enhanced the scope
of the automatic stay, the debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing, and also increased judicial discretion in the appointment of
trustee, a step that was automatic under the 1938 code.
24statutory changes to the bankruptcy code (e.g. Adler, Capkun and Weiss 2006). What can thus
explain the change of systematic bias over time? Our model can rationalize both this change
in judicial attitudes and the change in bankruptcy outcomes as being the result of demand and
supply forces, and in particular as the result of an increase in creditors’ control in bankruptcy.
Indeed, several scholars (e.g. Skeel 2001, Baird and Rasmussen 2003, Ayotte and Morrison 2007)
document that creditors are now in control of the reorganization process.28 On the one hand,
greater creditor control may imply a greater ability to select the bankruptcy venue (akin to a
smaller p in the context of Section 5.2). On the other hand, greater creditor control may imply a
greater ability to replace ﬁnancially distressed managers in bankruptcy and lower deviations from
absolute priority, which translates directly to a higher α in the context of our model. It is indeed
the case that managerial turnover in Chapter 11 has increased sharply, from around 50% in the
1980s (Gilson 1990) and 1990s (Hotchkiss 1995), to about 80% in recent years (Ayotte and Morrison
2007), and that very few recent reorganization plans deviate from absolute priority (Ayotte and
Morrison 2007). Consistent with the evidence, our model suggests that both of the above changes
would reduce the systematic pro-debtor bias of bankruptcy by reducing judges’ incentive to act in
a pro-debtor manner, and also by reducing the ability and the incentives of debtors to forum shop
(although without necessarily reducing observed forum shopping).
6.2 Additional Firm Level Predictions
Our model of judicial discretion also delivers additional testable predictions on ﬁrm level outcomes.
Although some of these predictions are shared with alternative theories, it is still interesting to see
that our parsimonious framework can generate so many implications consistent with the empirical
evidence on debt ﬁnance and resolutions of ﬁnancial distress across ﬁrms.
Section 5.3 delivers the novel prediction that the identity of bankruptcy judges should especially
matter for innovative and more volatile industries where uncertainty about the ﬁrm’s prospects is
greater. Ceteris paribus, this also implies that forum shopping should be especially widespread
in those industries where having the right judge is of the essence for debtors. Additionally, and
turning to ex ante issues, Section 5.3 implies that the cost of debt ﬁnance should be especially
large for ﬁrms in innovative and volatile industries, which should therefore be associated with a
28Interestingly, this change has occurred without substantial changes to the extent of judicial discretion, although
with the possible exception of DIP ﬁnancing (Ayotte and Morrison 2007, Adler et al. 2006), implying that natural
candidates for explaining these changes are the incentives of judges to use their discretion.
25greater use of equity ﬁnance. This prediction of our model is shared with the traditional view
that innovative industries are more likely to use equity to avoid debt overhang problems (Myers
1977). However, this view is incomplete, because Chapter 11 is precisely a mechanism to allow
bankrupt ﬁrms to raise DIP ﬁnancing and undertake positive NPV projects. Our model thus
provides a rationale for why Chapter 11 may be more costly for more innovative and volatile ﬁrms:
judicial discretion may be a prohibitively costly mechanism to resolve ﬁnancial distress for ﬁrms
with uncertain prospects.
More standard ﬁrm-level predictions of our model concern the capital structure, which should
heavily rely on equity (which is perhaps subject to less pro-debtor enforcement) so as to avoid the
costs of judicial discretion in bankruptcy.29 Thus, judicial discretion and debtors’ forum shopping
may be responsible for the puzzling observation that debt levels in U.S. corporations are usually
thought to be much lower than would be expected given the large tax beneﬁts of issuing debt as
opposed to equity (Graham 2000, Warner 1977, Parrino and Weisbach 1999). Another empirical
prediction of our model concerns private workouts, as under forum shopping creditors have a strong
incentive to make concessions to debtors so as to avoid that ﬁnancial distress is resolved by a very
pro-debtor judge. Thus, our model helps explain why U.S. creditors typically try to avoid Chapter
11 via private negotiations and workouts (Gilson, John and Lang 1990), despite the fact that such
workouts are very costly in practice because they lead to asset sales at below market prices (Asquith,
Gertner and Scharfstein 1994).30
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have presented a supply and demand model of judicial discretion in corporate bankruptcy
that parsimoniously explains a wealth of empirical evidence on resolutions of ﬁnancial distress
and ﬁrm-level outcomes, and also yields novel predictions on the workings of court-supervised
bankruptcy procedures. One key result is that stronger creditor protection improves judicial
incentives, promoting a "race to the top" in court competition towards the most eﬃcient uses of
judicial discretion.
29This eﬀect may be due to the diﬀerent dynamics of forum shopping for equity contracts. For example, a ﬁrm’s
incorporation decision might be a credible way for manage r st oc o m m i tt oac o u r tm a x i m i z i n gt h ev a l u eo fe q u i t y .
In contrast to debt, where the bankruptcy venue is chosen ex post, this would create a beneﬁcial competition among
judges to properly enforce equity contracts.
30Our model can also shed light on the timing of bankruptcy ﬁlings because, consistent with Bernhardt and Nosal
(2004), pro-debtor bias promotes early bankruptcy ﬁlings by discouraging entrepreneurs to hide ﬁnancial distress for
fear of being ousted by creditors. The formal proof is available upon request.
26Clearly, drawing normative implications is beyond the scope of our paper. Indeed, one normative
message of our model is that bankruptcy reforms that do not explicitly take into account judicial
incentives may be doomed to fail. However, it is not obvious what is in practice the best way to
do so. For example, it has been argued that parties should be allowed to specify the bankruptcy
venue already in the debt contract (e.g. Schwartz 1997). Our model clearly shows that while
this provision may beneﬁcially reduce the demand for biased adjudication and systematic bias,
such reform is unlikely to directly improve the supply of unbiased adjudication; if the number of
unbiased courts is not very large, some cases will inevitably end up in pro-creditor or pro-debtor
courts, undermining eﬃciency. In other words, contracting about the bankruptcy venue is likely to
dampen the costs of systematic bias but not those of judicial idiosyncrasies.
Perhaps the most eﬀective reform proposal emerging from our analysis would be to improve
creditor protection in reorganization, as shown in Section 4. This reform would reduce the demand
of biased adjudication and the ﬁrms’ incentives to forum shop, thereby dampening systematic bias.
Unlike other reforms however, such as for example increasing legal restrictions to forum shopping,
increasing creditor protection would also reduce the costs of judicial idiosyncrasies. There are
several ways in which creditor protection could be increased in practice.31 Here, consistent with
recent U.S. evidence, we wish to stress the possibility of increasing creditor protection with ﬂexible
contractual instruments allowing creditors to exert more control in bankruptcy. The possibility of
using those instruments is however often limited in many countries, because of legal restrictions
to doing so (Djankov et al. 2006). In this respect, and in line with Gennaioli and Rossi (2007),
one way to interpret our results is that we provide additional arguments in favor of increasing
freedom of contract in the resolution of ﬁnancial distress. In the current context, contracts would
complement rather than substitute formal bankruptcy procedures by improving the workings of
judicial discretion.
31One example would be automatic removal of failed managers. Not only would this improve judicial incentives
by reducing debtors’ payoﬀ from forum shopping, but it may also reduce the supply of biased adjudication, because
pro-debtor judges might be less sympathetic to ﬁnancial distress experts than to failed managers who devoted time
and eﬀort to rescue their ﬁrms. Interestingly, recent market-based developments line up with this idea, such as for
example the increasing use of turnaround specialists (Byers, Lee, Martin and Parrino 2007) in the reorganization of
ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.
27Appendix 1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. With respect to ﬁrst period adjudication (in the second period courts
follow their static optimum), three types of equilibria can arise: pooling, separating and semi-
separating. In pooling equilibria all courts behave the same way. In separating equilibria each
court follows its static optimum. In semi-separating equilibria one court separates while the other
two pool. Let us consider the most interesting case from the standpoint of our paper, namely the
pooling equilibrium where all courts behave like pro-debtor ones.
1) Pooling Equilibrium. Is there an equilibrium where, for every bias βj, all courts adjudicate
a c c o r d i n gt ot h er u l ex1,βj (ρ)=1? As discussed in the text, debtors’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs
are such that a court setting
£
x1 (ρ)=1 ,x 1(ρ) < 1
¤
is believed to be unbiased, a court setting
£
x1 (ρ) < 1,x 1(ρ) < 1
¤
is believed to be pro-creditor, while a court setting
£
x1 (ρ) < 1,x 1(ρ)=1
¤
is
believed to be pro-creditor. If a court pools, it obtains 1 case in periods 1 and 2 (because a measure
1/3 of cases is allocated to courts of its same type and there is a measure 1/3 of such courts) and
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.B o t hf (α,c) and f (α,c) decrease
in c and α,a sg r e a t e rﬁling restrictions and higher creditor protection reduce forum shopping.
An unbiased court deviating and choosing its static optimum retains all ﬁrms with reorganization
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¢
. At the above out-of-equilibrium beliefs, these are the only possible deviations.
An unbiased court will never pretend to be pro-creditor: such court would lose more ﬁrms than
by acting sincerely. Also, there is no reason for a pro-debtor court to deviate, as the court would
signal itself as pro-creditor or unbiased. Accordingly, it is easy to check that pro-creditor courts
will always deviate (if they ever do) by playing their static optimum as opposed to pretending to
28be unbiased. The above analysis implies that an equilibrium where all courts behave as pro-debtor
in the ﬁrst period exists provided:
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By condition (9) an unbiased court prefers to pool rather than to be perceived unbiased. By
condition (10) a pro-creditor courts prefers to be perceived as pro-debtor as opposed to pro-creditor.
A pooling equilibrium exists when:
γ ≥ (λ − ρ)/λf (α,c) (11)
γ ≥ 2
©
λ − E (ρ)
£







A pooling equilibrium can only arise insofar as courts put a suﬃciently large weight on the fu-
ture. Also, both conditions above are harder to meet if α and c are larger because reduced future
forum shopping reduces the incentives of unbiased and pro-creditor courts to mimic pro-debtor
ones [moreover, since in (12) βj < 1, also the denominator of (12) increases in α]. To charac-
terize under what conditions does a pooling equilibrium exists, suppose that α = c =0 . In this
case, f(α,c)=f(α,c)=1 . These are the conditions most favorable to the pooling equilibrium
because forum shopping is maximal. Then, (11) and (12) are fullﬁlled for γ ≥ (λ − ρ)/λ and
γ ≥
©
2λ − (ρ + ρ)
£
α + βj (1 − α)
¤ª
/λ.F o rλ ≤ E (ρ), there always (i.e. for any βj)e x i s t ss o m e
γ(α,c) < 1 satisfying the three conditions above, as f(α,c) and f(α,c) are continuous in α and c.
More generally, for λ ≤ E (ρ) one can ﬁnd two thresholds α<1 and c<∞ such that, for α ≤ α
and c ≤ c there exists a γ(α,c) < 1. By contrast, if λ>E(ρ), the pooling equilibrium cannot
arise for any α and c.A sar e s u l t ,w es e tγ(α,c)=1 . Notice that in both cases γ(α,c) increases
(weakly) in both α and c.
2) Separating equilibrium. There might also be separating equilibria where some or all
courts signal their true type. Since our goal is to outline the conditions under which a pooling
pro-debtor equilibrium may arise, it is beyond the scope of the paper to fully characterize all
separating equilibria. Nevertheless, we now brieﬂy consider when such separation may arise. Under
29the previous out-of-equilibrium beliefs, a fully separating equilibrium arises provided:



















Condition (13) makes sure that an unbiased court prefers not to mimic a pro-debtor one, conditions
(14) and (15) make sure that a pro-creditor court does not want to mimic an unbiased and a pro-
debtor court, respectively. It is easy to check that these are the only possible deviations. For the
separating equilibrium to occur, courts must be impatient. Furthermore, notice that conditions (13)
and (15), which are the opposite of conditions (11) and (12), imply that a pooling and a separating
equilibrium cannot coexist. As a result, under the assumed out-of-equilibrium beliefs the unique
equilibrium for γ>γ (α,c) is a pooling pro-debtor equilibrium. Deﬁne e γ (α,c) as the threshold
such that for γ ≤ e γ (α,c) conditions (13), (14), (15) are satisﬁed. Clearly, e γ (α,c) ≤ γ (α,c),a n d
e γ (α,c) increases in α and c. Then, for γ ≤ e γ (α,c) a fully separating equilibrium prevails. For
γ ∈ [e γ (α,c),γ(α,c)] a semi-separating equilibrium may arise where pro-creditor courts pool with
unbiased ones.
Proof of Corollary 2. Ex post welfare is W(α,c)=Eβ,ρ{λ + xβ (ρ)(ρ − λ)+fρ,β (α,c)(ρ − λ)[1− xβ (ρ)]}.
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Given ρ <λ , dW(α,c)/dc > 0 for any B(α) (even for Pr(β ≤ βρ)=1 ) if and only if E(ρ2) ≥ λE(ρ).









(ρ − λ)[1− fρ,β (α,c)]b(βρ)dβρ/dα
ª
/c,
where b(βρ) is the density function of β evaluated at the threshold βρ.W ek n o wf r o ma b o v et h a tt h e
ﬁrst term is positive and it is easy to ﬁnd that the second term is negative as well. Indeed, ρ−λ<0
and dβρ/dα > 0,w h i l eρ − λ>0 and dβρ/dα < 0.A sar e s u l t ,w eh a v et h a ti fE(ρ2) ≥ λE(ρ),
also dW(α,c)/dα is positive. Notice also that limc→∞ W(α,c)=Eβ,ρ{λ + xβ (ρ)(ρ − λ)} while
limα→1 W(α,c)=( λ + ρ)/2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . The overall proportion of reorganized ﬁrms is equal to:
Eβ,δ,ρ{fβ,δ,ρ(α,c)+[ 1− fβ,δ,ρ(α,c)]xβ (ρ)} = Eβ,δ,ρ{xβ (ρ)+fβ,δ,ρ(α,c)[1− xβ (ρ)]} ≥ 1/2 (16)
As a result, also in this case there is a systematic pro debtor bias. Such bias falls in legal restrictions
30c, as the derivative of (16) with respect to c is equal to −Eβ,δ,ρ{fβ,δ,ρ(α,c)[1− xβ (ρ)]}/c < 0.E x
post social welfare is equal to:
W(α,c)=Eβ,δ,ρ{fβ,δ,ρ(α,c)ρ + δ [1 − fβ,δ,ρ(α,c)][λ + xβ (ρ)(ρ − λ)]} (17)
































/2 ≤ 0, which is true whenever ϕ ≤ ϕ∗ ≡ 2E
¡
ρ2¢
/(ρ2 − ρλ).N o t i c e t h a t ϕ∗ > 1
irrespective of the sign of E(ρ2) − λE(ρ).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . Suppose that δ =0and ϕ =1 /2.G i v e nδ =0 , all debtors allocated
to slow natural venues try to ﬁle in fast courts granting reorganization. In the ﬁrst period, a














of cases leaves each slow court and ﬁles in the
corresponding fast court. In the second period, the outcome depends on the equilibrium prevailing
in the ﬁrst period. In a pooling equilibrium, each slow court is left by e f ﬁrms which then ﬁle in a
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This is an equilibrium if courts are better oﬀ pooling than playing their static optimum. We assume












. An unbiased court deviating to its static optimum keeps all ﬁrms with
ρ = ρ, loses a fraction 1−f of ﬁrms with ρ = ρ, and does not attract debtors located in slow courts,








/2. A pro-creditor court deviating to its optimal
static policy loses 1−f ﬁrms with ρ = ρ, 1−f ﬁrms with ρ = ρ, and does not attract debtors from
slow courts, obtaining λ
n
(1 + e f)+γ
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. As we have seen before, these are the only
relevant deviations. Thus, an equilibrium where all courts behave as pro-debtor in the ﬁrst period
31exists provided:
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A pooling equilibrium exists provided:
γ ≥ (λ − ρ)(1 + e f)/
h
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(21)
It is easy to check that the two above inequality are easier to meet than those ensuring the pooling
equilibrium of Proposition 3.
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Notice that p∗ ∈ [0,1]. Consider how systematic bias varies with c. The derivative of (22) with re-
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which is positive for p<p ∗ and negative otherwise. Thus, as indicated by Proposition 7, the total
proportion of reorganized ﬁrms increases if the systematic bias is pro-creditor and decreases other-
wise. It is immediate to check that an increase in ck/cd (leaving contant ck +cd) reduces the value
of p∗ while an increase in ck + cd (leaving constant ck/cd)l e a v e si tu n a ﬀected.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 . It is useful to start by recalling that rj maximizes the court’s utility






=0 .C o n s i d e r n o w t h e e ﬀect of θj on the probability of liquidation

























βj (1 − α)ρ +( αρ − λ)
(λ − αρ) − βj (1 − α)ρ
¸¾
where the last equality exploits the court’s ﬁrst order condition in setting rj and the deﬁnition
of rj.T h u s , t h e e ﬀect of θj on the probability of liquidation is positive if and only if βj > 1.





















βj (1 − α)ρ +( αρ − λ)
(λ − αρ) − βj (1 − α)ρ
¸¾
where the equality exploits the court’s ﬁrst order condition in setting rj. Thus repayment falls in
θj. if and only if βj > 1.
Appendix 2. Ex Ante Consequences of Judicial Discretion
To study the impact of judicial discretion on debt ﬁnancing and investment, suppose that ρ
is the productivity attached to the concave production function f (I) under reorganization, λ the
productivity under liquidation. I ≥ 0 is the level of ex ante investment and f (.) satisﬁes the usual
Inada conditions. Consider the case where only debtors can forum shop. Then, if the expected
probability of reorganization is equal to e x(ρ)=[ 1 − fρ,β]xβ (ρ)+fρ,β, the debtor proposes the
creditor a ﬁnancial contract solving:
max
A,I
A + Eρ {(1 − α)ρe x(ρ)}f (I) (23)
s.t. Eρ {λ[1 − e x(ρ)] + αρe x(ρ)}f (I) ≥ A + I (24)
A ≥ 0 (25)
The contract maximizes the debtor’s payoﬀ by stipulating that the creditor should ﬁnance invest-
ment I and advance to the debtor an additional payment A which is set so as to ensure creditor
break-even (we are assuming that there is perfect competition among creditors). The constraint
A ≥ 0 simply reﬂects the fact that the debtor has no initial wealth. Since the payment A renders
33the debtor full residual claimant to the proﬁts of the ﬁrm, the above problem boils down to:
max
I
Eρ {λ[1 − e x(ρ)] + ρe x(ρ)}f (I) − I (26)
s.t. Eρ {λ[1 − e x(ρ)] + αρe x(ρ)}f (I) ≥ I (27)
That is, the optimal contract maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts (26) [i.e. his average revenues
under the expected reorganization policy minus investment costs] subject to the creditor’s break
even constraint (27). The ﬁrst order condition of the problem is:
Eρ
½






μEρ {λ[1 − e x(ρ)] + αρe x(ρ)f (I) − I} =0 (29)
where μ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the creditor’s break even constraint. μ measures
the tightness of the break even constraint. It is then immediate to ﬁnd:
Proposition 9 If the break even constraint is binding (i.e. μ>0) debt and ex ante investment
increase in c and in α. Forum shopping reduces debt and investment by reallocating cases to judges
with higher βj.
The logic behind this result is simple. If μ>0, debt and investment are determined by (28)
and they increase in the expected repayment to the creditor, which in turn falls with e x(ρ) for every
ρ, as showed by Proposition 1. Clearly, the expected probability of reorganization falls in c and α
as both parameters reduce forum shopping to pro-debtor courts.
Broadly speaking, Proposition 9 suggests that under judicial discretion, debtors’ forum shopping
increases the ex ante costs of debt ﬁnance by undermining repayment. An immediate reaction to
these costs could be for entrepreneurs to relax their ﬁnancial constraints by issuing equity, which
is perhaps less subject to pro-debtor enforcement.
An alternative reaction to the cost of forum shopping may be for the parties to contract ex ante
about the bankruptcy venue. These contracts are often legally forbidden (Schwartz 1997), but it
is still interesting to see what would be the outcome if they were allowed. Ex ante, the parties
solve the above contracting problem by picking an optimal reorganization policy e x(ρ) among those
implemented by bankruptcy courts. It is worthwhile stressing that in this case the venue choice
would be formulated ex ante and there would thus be no forum shopping ex post. The optimal
34choice of e x(ρ) for every ρ adds to (28) and (29) the following ﬁrst order condition:
−λ(1 + μ)+ρ(1 + αμ) ≥ 0 (30)
The parties set e x(ρ)=1if and only if (30) holds. It is immediate that this can only be true at
ρ. As a result, the parties will choose an unbiased or pro-creditor judge. In particular, for αρ ≥ λ
the parties choose an unbiased judge. By contrast, for αρ<λthe parties choose an unbiased
judges provided μ ≤ (ρ−λ)/(λ−αρ) and a pro-creditor judge otherwise. The intuition is that it is
optimal for the parties to ex ante commit to always liquidate the project when the creditor’s break
even constraint is highly binding. By so doing, the parties proﬁtably increase ex ante investment.
This model of ex ante contracting predicts that onl yo n et y p eo fc o u r t( u n b i a s e do rp r o - c r e d i t o r
depending on parameters) will be used in equilibrium. Thus, in a career concerns version all courts
will try to mimic that one. Not surprisingly, in this model of ex ante contracting competition
among courts is beneﬁcial and triggers eﬃcient outcomes.
Appendix 3. Private Workouts
Suppose that before going to court the debtor and the creditors can negotiate a private workout.
Assume for simplicity that the investor has all the bargaining power. Then, a ﬁrm of type ρ which
ended up before a judge reorganizing it with probability x(ρ) is spared ineﬃcient reorganization, as
the investor can oﬀer an amount (1 − α)ρx(ρ) of liquidation proceeds to the entrepreneur. Thus,
the workout is successful and ex post eﬃciency is attained. Consider now the case of a ﬁrm of type
ρ which ended up before a judge reorganizing it with probability x(ρ). Because the entrepreneur
is cash constrained, to avoid unproﬁtable liquidation, he can promise to the investor at most αρ
of reorganization proceeds. As a result, the workout goes through and the ﬁrm is reorganized if
a n do n l yi fαρ ≥ λ. If instead α<λ / ρ, the workout fails and the ﬁrm is over-liquidated with
probability 1 − x(ρ). From this analysis, and consistent with Giammarino (1989), it is clear that
while workouts can soften some of the ex post costs of judicial bias, they cannot prevent pro-debtor
bias from reducing ex ante repayment and thus debt capacity and welfare. Even if αρ ≥ λ,
which is associated to workouts giving full ex post eﬃciency, expected repayment to creditors is
(1/2)
£
αρ + λ − x(ρ)(1− α)ρ
¤
,w h i c hf a l l si nx(ρ) and thus in βj. As a result, in line with Appendix
2 above, although workouts improve ex post eﬃciency and might sometimes induce full ex post
eﬃciency, they do not eliminate the ex ante cost of judicial bias.
35References
Abrams, David, Marianne Bertrand, and Sendhil Mullainathan 2006, Do judges vary in their treat-
ment of race? Mimeo, University of Chicago and Harvard University.
Adler, Barry E., Vedran Capkun, and Lawrence A. Weiss, 2006, Destruction of value in the new
era of Chapter 11, Mimeo, New York University.
Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton, 1992, An incomplete contracts approach to ﬁnancial con-
tracting. Review of Economic Studies 59, 473-494.
Asquith, Paul, Robert Gertner, and David Scharfstein, 1994, Anatomy of ﬁnancial distress: An
examination of junk-bond issuers, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 625-658.
Ayotte, Kenneth M., Stav Gaon, 2007, Asset backed securities: Costs and beneﬁts of "Bankruptcy
Remoteness", Mimeo, Columbia University.
Ayotte, Kenneth M., and Edward R. Morrison, 2007, Creditor control and conﬂict in Chapter 11,
Mimeo, Columbia University.
Ayotte, Kenneth M., and David A. Skeel, Jr., 2004, Why do distressed companies choose Delaware?
An empirical analysis of venue choice in bankruptcy, Mimeo, Columbia University.
Ayotte, Kenneth M., and Hayong Yun, 2006, Matching bankruptcy laws to legal environments,
working paper, Columbia Business School.
Baird, Douglas G., and Robert K. Rasmussen, 2003, Chapter 11 at twilight, 56 Stanford Law Review
623, 101-129.
Bernhardt, Dan, and Ed Nosal, 2004, Near-sighted justice, Journal of Finance 59, 2655-2684.
Berglöf, Eric, and Howard Rosenthal, 2001. The political economy of American bankruptcy: The
evidence from roll call voting, 1800-1978. Mimeo, Princeton University.
Berkovitch, Elazar, Ronen Israel, and Jaime F. Zender, 1998, The design of bankruptcy law: A
case for management bias in bankruptcy reorganizations, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 33, 441-464.
Bolton, Patrick, and Howard Rosenthal, 2002, Political intervention in debt contracts. Journal of
Political Economy 110, 1103-1134.
36Braucher, Jean, 1993, Lawyers and consumer bankruptcy: One code, many cultures, American
Bankruptcy Law Journal 67, 501-532.
Bris, Arturo, Ivo Welch, and Ning Zhu 2006, The costs of bankruptcy, Journal of Finance 61,
1253-1303.
Butler, Marcus, 2003, Valuation conﬂicts in corporate bankruptcy, PhD thesis, University of
Chicago GSB.
Byers, Steven S., D. Scott Lee, Gerald Martin and Robert Parrino, 2007, The eﬀectiveness of
turnaround artists, Mimeo, Texas A&M University.
Chang, Tom, and Antoinette Schoar, 2006, The eﬀect of judicial bias in Chapter 11 reorganization,
Mimeo, MIT.
Cho, In-Koo, and David M. Kreps, 1987, Signaling games and stable equilibria, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 102, 179-221.
Cole, Marcus, 2002, Delaware is not a state: Are we witnessing jurisdictional competition in bank-
ruptcy, Vanderbilt Law Review 55, 1845-1875.
Davydenko, Sergei, and Julian R. Franks 2007, Do bankruptcy codes matter? A study of defaults
in France, Germany and the U.K., Journal of Finance forthcoming.
Djankov, Simeon, Olived D. Hart, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer, 2006, Debt enforcement
around the world, working paper, Harvard University.
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer, 2007. Private credit in 129 countries,
Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299-329.
Elul, Ronel, and Narayanan Subramanian, 2002, Forum shopping and personal bankruptcy, Journal
of Financial Services Research 21, 233-255.
Enriques, Luca and Martin Gelter, 2006, Regulatory competition in European company law and
creditor protection, European Business Organization Law Review 7, 417-453.
Franks, Julian R., Kjell G. Nyborg and Walter N. Torous, 1996, A comparison of U.S., U.K. and
German insolvency codes, Financial Management 25, 19-30.
37Franks, Julian, R., and Oren Sussman, 2005, Financial innovations and corporate insolvency, Jour-
nal of Financial Intermediation 14, 283-317.
Franks, Julian R., and Walter N. Torous, 1993. A comparison of the U.K. and U.S. bankruptcy
codes. Continental Bank Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 6, 95-103.
Franks, Julian R., and Walter N. Torous, 1989. An empirical investigation of U.S. ﬁrms in reorga-
nization. Journal of Finance 44, 747-770.
Gennaioli, Nicola, 2005, Contracting in the shadow of the law, Mimeo, Stockholm University.
Gennaioli, Nicola, and Stefano Rossi, 2007, Optimal resolutions of ﬁnancial distress by contract,
Mimeo, Stockholm University and Stockholm School of Economics.
Gennaioli, Nicola, and Andrei Shleifer, 2006, Judicial fact discretion, Mimeo, Stockholm University
and Harvard University.
Giammarino, Ronald M., 1989, The resolution of ﬁnancial distress, Review of Financial Studies 2,
25-47.
Giammarino, Ronald M., and Ed Nosal, 1994, The eﬃciency of judicial discretion in bankruptcy
law, Mimeo, University of British Columbia.
Gilson, Stuart C., 1997, Transactions costs and capital structure choice: Evidence from ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms, Journal of Finance 52, 161-196.
Gilson, Stuart C., 1991, Managing default: Some evidence on how ﬁrms choose between workouts
and chapter 11, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 4, 62-70.
Gilson, Stuart C., 1990, Bankruptcy, boards, banks and blockholders: Evidence on changes in
corporate ownership and control when ﬁrms default, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 355-387.
Gilson, Stuart C., Kose John, and Larry H. P. Lang, 1990, Troubled debt restructurings: An
empirical study of private reorganization of ﬁrms in default, Journal of Financial Economics 27,
315-353.
Graham, John R., 2000, How big are the tax beneﬁts of debt? Journal of Finance 55, 1901-1941.
Guzman, Andrew T., 2000, International bankruptcy: In defense of universalism, Michigan Law
38Review 98, 2177-2215.
Hart, Oliver D., 2000, Diﬀerent approaches to bankruptcy, in Governance, Equity and Global Mar-
kets, Proceedings of the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe. Paris:
La Documentation Francaise.
Hart, Oliver D., 1995, Firms, contracts and ﬁnancial structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Holmström, Bengt, 1999, Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 66, 169-182.
Hotchkiss, Edith Shwalb, 1995, Postbankruptcy performance and management turnover, Journal
of Finance 50, 3-21.
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the ﬁrm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Kraus, Alan, and Robert H. Litzenberger, 1973, A state-preference model of optimal ﬁnancial
leverage, Journal of Finance 28, 911-922.
LoPucki, Lynn M., 2005, Courting failure: How competition for big cases is corrupting the bank-
ruptcy courts, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.
LoPucki, Lynn M., and Joseph W. Doherty, 2002, Why are Delaware and New York bankruptcy
reorganizations failing?, Vanderbilt Law Review 55, 1933-1986.
LoPucki, Lynn M., and Sara D. Kalin, 2001, The failure of public company bankruptcies in Delaware
and New York: Empirical evidence of a “race to the bottom,” Vanderbilt Law Review 54, 231-282.
LoPucki, Lynn M., and William C. Whitford, 1991, Venue choice and forum shopping in the
bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies, Wisconsin Law Review, 11-63.
McCahery, Joseph A., 2006, Creditor protection in a cross-border context, European Business
Organization Law Review 7, 455-459.
Parrino, Robert, and Michael S. Weisbach, 1999, Measuring investment distortions arising from
stockholder-bondholder conﬂicts, Journal of Financial Economics 53, 3-42.
Partridge, Anthony, and William Eldridge, 1974, The second circuit sentencing study,F e d e r a l
39Judicial Center.
Rasmussen, Robert, 2007, Where are all the transnational bankruptcies, Mimeo, Vanderbilt.
Schwartz, Alan, 1997, Contracting about bankruptcy, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organiza-
tions 13, 127-146.
Skeel, David A. Jr., 2001. Debt’s dominion: A history of bankruptcy law in America.P r i n c e t o n
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Warner, Jerold B., 1977, Bankruptcy costs: Some evidence, Journal of Finance 32, 337-347.
Weiss, Lawrence A., 1990, Bankruptcy resolution: Direct costs and violation of priority of claims,
Journal of Financial Economics 27, 285-314.
Weiss, Lawrence A., and Karen H. Wruck, 1998, Information problems, conﬂicts of interests, and
asset stripping: Chapter 11’s failure in the case of Eastern Airlines, Journal of Financial Economics
48, 55-97.
White, Michelle J., 2006, Asbestos litigation: Procedural innovations and forum shopping, Journal
of Legal Studies 35, 365-398.
White, Michelle J., 1996, The costs of corporate bankruptcy: A U.S.-European perspective, in
Jagdeep S. Bhandari and Lawrence A. Weiss, (eds.), Corporate bankruptcy: Economic and legal
perspectives, New York, Cambridge University Press.
40